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For over 100 years Indian women who married 
non-Indians lost their Band Membership 
and Indian status and their right to live in 
and return to their home communities. 
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Aboriginal women of Canada have struggled since 1967 to 
have their right to identity and their civil and political 
rights recognized. Part of this battle included changing 
century-old provisions in the Indian Act which banished 
women from their families and communities by forcing 
them to give up their Indian status, Band membership, 
and, essentially, their identity as Aboriginal women if they 
married outside their race (Leslie and Macguire 25). The 
Tory government amended the Indian Act in June 1985 
through Bill C-31. Aboriginal women's struggle contin- 
ues, however, as some Indian Chiefi are trying to overturn 
the amendments in court, claiming they interfere with 
their jurisdiction to determine membership in their own 
communities. It is my position that the civil and political 
rights of Indian women arc hndarnental human rights, 
and that they are Aboriginal rights which are now recog- 
nized under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1 9 8 2 . ~  
These rights have never be extinguished and they continue 
to exist. 
Under the Indian Act, when Indian women married 
non-Indians they were banished from their communities 
and their legal right to be "Indian" was stripped from 
them. Indian women who married members of the "set- 
tler" community were excommunicated from Indian re- 
serves and never allowed to return, even upon divorce. 
This denied their right and their ability to participate in 
elections of Indian Act Chiefi and Councillors, as well as 
removing their ability to choose to live on the reserve and 
to remain part oftheir Aboriginal community. The Indian 
Act provisions directly affected 12,000 Indian women, 
and constituted a severe restriction on their exercise of 
their civil and political rights. In 1985, these women and 
approximately 40,000 descendants were restored to their 
previous Indian status and Band membership. 
One form of regulation with respect to political rights 
was removed when the intermarriage provisions were 
amended. Sex discrimination still exists in the Indian Act 
in the area of civil and property rights, however, and needs 
to be challenged under the Canadian Charter offigha and 
Freehms (hereafter Charter). Because marital property 
rights for Canadians is governed by provincial law and not 
federal law, in cases of Indian divorces involving land on 
Indian reserves, the wife is legally disadvantaged com- 
pared to other Canadian women. There is no federal law 
granting rights to women in cases of marital dispute or 
separation, and the Supreme Court of Canada has held in 
Dmmrckson U. Derrickson and Paul v. Paul that where there 
is a conflict between federal and provincial law, federal law 
prevails in the case of Indians. Also, wives of Indians living 
on reserve cannot enjoy any benefits related to possession 
of land in the event of divorce from an Indian male unless 
they own the land in their own name, with the blessing of 
the Band Council and the Minister of Indian and N o d -  
ern AEairs. There is also continuing sex discrimination 
against Indian women which impacts upon their voting or 
political rights because 98 per cent of reinstated women 
and their children cannot vote for Chiefs and Council 
because they do not live on the resem. This is an estimated 
12,000 Indian women who regained status and their 
estimated 40,000 descendants in the first generation. 
Their second generation descendants are discriminated 
against compared to their cousins from male Indians. Sex 
discrimination continues in the Indian Act. 
The recent Sparrow decision will be extremely signifi- 
cant for Aboriginal women in arguing that their political 
and civil rights are existing Aboriginal rights which have 
not been extinguished, in spite of the intermarriage provi- 
sions in the Indian Act. It will also be vital in arguing that 
any other existing and hture discriminatory measures 
imposed by government or by Aboriginal communities 
are contrary to section 35(1) of the Constitution. 
Before Spamw and before section 35(1) of the Consti- 
tution Act, 1982, the Government of Canada could and 
did discriminate against Indian women on the basis ofsex. 
For over 100 years Indian women who married non- 
Indians lost their Band Membership and I n d i  status and 
their right to live in and return to their home communi- 
ties. Not only did they deny them the right to live with 
their own families and people, but it denied them access to 
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their Aboriginal languages, cultures, and traditions as was 
found in the Lovekzce v. C a d  case decided by the 
United Nations Committee on Human Rights. The 
Supreme Court of Canada in Lavellv. HerMajesty in 1974 
upheld the right of Canada to discriminate declaring that 
parliamentary supremacy meant if Canada had jurisdic- 
tion over Indians it could decide "who was an Indian." 
Parliament for 100 years decided Indian women were no 
longer Indians when they married non-Indians, and it 
decided non-Indian women were "Indians" when they 
married male Indians. These practices ended in 1985 will 
Big C-31, An Act to Ammd the Indian Act. 
The right of women to maintain their civic and 
political rob bar existed since time immemorial. 
These rights are part of customary Iaws ofAborigina1 
people and part of the right of seFgovernment. 
Prior to 1982, federal Indian matters were governad solely 
by section 9 l(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly 
called the British NorthAmericaAct), under which author- 
ity Parliament passed successive versions of the Indian A n  
Parliamentary supremacy ensured that Indians had no 
rights except those granted in legislation. This changed in 
1982 with constitutional amendments recognizing the 
"existing" Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peo- 
ples of Canada. Parliamentary supremacy is no longer 
enough. If Aboriginal and treaty rights are to be extin- 
guished, they must be done so explicitly in law, and likely 
with the consent ofAboriginal peoples. What the Sparrow 
decision added was a reinterpretation of the regulation of 
rights versus the extinguishment of rights. The Supreme 
Court held that just because Aboriginal (fishing) rights 
were regulated for 100 years did not mean they were 
extinguished. Similarly for Aboriginal women's civil and 
political rights. Even if they were heavily regulated under 
the Indian Act for 100 years, it did not mean these rights 
were extinguished. 
In the Sparrow case, which is a landmark case indicating 
the legal interpretation that will be given to section 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Government attempted 
to prove that the right of Musqueam Indians to fish in the 
Fraser River had been extinguished by regulation prior to 
1982, and therefore could not be recognized as an existing 
right under section 35(l).*The Supreme Court disagreed 
with this position, and held that the fact "[tlhat the right 
is controlled in great detail by the regulations does not 
mean that the right is thereby extinguished" (Sparrow 
400). Ifa right is not extinguished, it exists. Furthermore, 
the court ruled that: 
an existing Aboriginal right cannot bc read so as to 
incorporate the specific manner in which it was 
regulated before 1982. The notion offreaing existing 
rights would incorporate into the Constitution a crazy 
patchwork of regulations. (Sparrow 396) 
The Supreme Court agreed with Brim Slattery that "exist- 
ing" means "unextinguished" instead of "exercisable at a 
certain time in history" (sparrow 3%),3 and held that the 
term "existing" must be interpreted flexibly to permit its 
evolution over time (Sparrow 397). 
Sparrow is significant in holding that certain Aboriginal 
and treaty rights may be regulated without being extin- 
guished as a result. Aboriginal women's civil and political 
rights were regulated from 1867 to 1985 by the intermar- 
riage provisions in the Indian Act, but I argue, that the 
fundamental human rights of Aboriginal women-in- 
cluding civil and political righ-form part ofthe inherent 
right to Aboriginal self-government which is now recog- 
nized and protected under section 35(1) ofthe Constitution 
Act, 1982. The decision in Sparrow provides a framework 
within which to make this argument. 
The civil and political rights ofAboriginal women differ 
according to culture and tribal traditions. Most Aboriginal 
societies were traditionally matriarchal and matrilineal, 
induding hunting and gathering societies. Aboriginal 
women's civil and political rights arc foundational and do 
not derive their existence from documents or treaties 
(Sparrow 390). The right of women to establish and 
maintain their civic and political role has existed since time 
immemorial. These rights are part of customary laws of 
Aboriginal people and part of the right of Aboriginal self- 
government. "Such practices or forms of social organiza- 
tion do not require the imprimatur ofstate action to qualify 
as rights" (Sparrow 506). 
Self-government is central to Aboriginal nationhood, 
culture, and existence, and the civil and political rights of 
women are central to traditional, matriarchal, and egalitar- 
ian forms of government. IfAboriginal self-government is 
central to the existence ofAboriginal nations, so must also 
the ability to determine civil and political rights of mem- 
bers be central to the exercise of the right ofAboriginal self- 
government (Asch and Macklem 505). This includes the 
right ofwomen to define their roles in Aboriginal commu- 
nities. 
The rights of women were not explicitly recognized in 
the treaties between the Aboriginal peoples and the settlers, 
but they are rights which women have exercised since the 
formation of their indigenous societies. In some cases, 
these rights were suppressed or regulated by non-Aborigi- 
nal law, such as the Indian Act. 
The Sparrow decision makes it dear, however, that 
Aboriginal women's civil and political rights were not 
frozen in their regulated form when section 35(1) recog- 
nized and affirmed "existing" Aboriginal rights. Using the 
Court's interpretation, the civil and political rights of 
Aboriginal women were affirmed in 1982 in their contem- 
porary form "rather than in their primeval simplicity and 
vigour" (Sparrow 397), or in the form they had been 
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restricted to under the Indian Act. Moreover, even if 
women's rights were so restricted that women were ban- 
ished from Aboriginal communities, this in itself does not 
lead to extinguishment of their rights. There can be no 
"extinguishment by regulation" ofAboriginal rights (Spar- 
row 39 1). Moreover, fundamental human rights, like civil 
and political rights of Aboriginal women, can never be 
extinguished. Therefore, these rights existed in some form 
in 1982, and are now recognized and affirmed in their full, 
unregulated form under section 35(1). 
Sparrow held that there must be a "dear and plain" 
intention on the part of the Government where it intends 
The scope of modern-day Abor i~na l  women i civil 
andpolitical rights will be determined in the context 
of the inherent right of seIf-government. They 
h n d  to be part of the policy and processes. 
to extinguish Aboriginal and treaty rights. This holding 
relied on a statement by Justice Hall in G r l h  that: "the 
onus ofproving that the Sovereign intended to extinguish 
the Indian title lies on the respondent and that intention 
must be 'dear and plain'" (2 16). The Court also noted that 
in "the context ofAboriginal rights, it could be argued that 
before 1982, an Aboriginal right was automatically extin- 
guished to the extent that it was inconsistent with a 
statuten (Sparrow 401). On this point, Aboriginal women 
would have had to overcome the argument that their 
political and civil rights were necessarily inconsistent with 
the Indian Act, had Bill C-31 not reinstated them and 
attempted to end sex discrimination against Indian women. 
Prior to the 1985 amendments to the Indian Act, 
Parliament made it clear in law that Indian women who 
married with non-Indian men lost their civil and political 
rights within their communities. The Luvell decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada agreed that parliamentary 
supremacy and the federal power to pass laws in relation 
to Indians and lands reserved for Indians under section 
9 l(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gave parliamentar- 
ians the right to determine who had Indian status. 
After the 1985 amendments to the Indian Act, Parlia- 
ment's clear and plain intention was restorative of rights 
that had been regulated (Sparrow 401). It reinstated 
Indian women and their children to their communities 
and ended legislated sex discrimination. Even if an Indian 
woman had lost status forty years earlier than 1985, she 
could have that status restored. If she had since died, she 
could still have her status restored. In either case, her 
descendants could apply to have Indian status and Band 
membership. The legislation also restored control of band 
membership and regulation of Indian lands to Indian Act 
governments. The legislation effectively restored the civil 
and political rights of Indian women who regained their 
Band membership and right to vote in Band elections . 
The scope of modern-day Aboriginal women's civil and 
political rights will be determined in the context of the 
inherent right ofself-government. Over the past few years, 
organized Aboriginal women's groups like the Native 
Women's Association of Canada have fought for partid- 
patory rights. In other words, they demand, as women, to 
be part of the policy and legislative processes that are being 
set up to define, develop and interpret their fbrms of 
Aboriginal government. This process indudcs dcfining 
who is a member of the "groupn or of the "collective." 
What Bill C-31 did was to restore women and their 
descendants to the "base group," Band or Tribe that will 
exercise the right of self-government. 
Some Aboriginal leaders and some governments will 
look to the nature ofAboriginal women's civil and politi- 
cal rights and believe that the manner in which the rights 
were regulated under the Indian Act will determine the 
scope of the rights. The Court in Sparrow rejected that 
approach. Aboriginal women, themselves, must be part of 
the process of delineating their civil and political rights. 
The Court also held that any future restriction on Aborigi- 
nal rights "must be in keepingwith section 35(1) (Sparrow 
40 1). As a result, Aboriginal women can use section 35(1) 
as a point of negotiation for definition of their modern 
civil and political rights. 
The Court in Sparrow also stated that section 35(1) was 
to be interpreted in a purposive way: "[W] hen the purposes 
of the affirmation ofAborigind rights are considered, it is 
clear that a generous, liberal interpretation of the words in 
the constitutional provision is demanded" (407). This 
provides further support for the argument that section 
35(1) recognized and ;Iff~rmed the civil and political rights 
of Aboriginal women as part of the inherent right of 
Aboriginal self-government. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has also held that 
Aboriginal and treaty rights should be interpreted by 
taking into account Aboriginal history and tradition (Spar- 
row 408).~ In interpreting Aboriginal women's civil and 
political rights as Aboriginal and treaty rights under sec- 
tion 35(1), the Court must take into account the historic 
roles ofwomen within their traditional as well as contem- 
porary Aboriginal societies. In this context, it is argued 
that the federal government has an active responsibility to 
respect and protect the rights ofAboriginal women as part 
of its fiduciary duty toward Aboriginal people. 
The relationship between the government and Abo- 
riginals is trust-like, rather than adversarid, and con- 
temporary recognition and affirmation ofAborigind 
rights must be defined in light of this historic rela- 
tionship. (Gurrin) 
This trust responsibility may also require the Government 
ofCanada to protect the civil and political roles ofAborigi- 
nal women within their societies. 
One of the purposes of Bill C-31 was to remove sex 
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discrimination from the Indian Act and bring the legis- 
lation in line with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedom. Discrimination on the basis of sex is no longer 
allowed under section 15 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedom. Furthermore, in 1983, Aboriginal women were 
successful in lobbying federal and provincial govern- 
ments, and Aboriginal leaders, to have section 35(4) 
added to the Constitution Act, I982 which affirms that 
Aboriginal and treaty rights are guaranteed equally to 
men and women. This, to women, is a double confirma- 
tion of their rights. The section did not create new rights, 
but confirmed that women's rights are contained in 
The federaZgovernment has an active 
responsibility to respect andprotect the righs 
ofAboriginaZ women a p a r t  of its fiduciary 
duty toward Abori'naZ peoph. 
section 35(1) ( N o w i c k  198). Both of these instru- 
ments prevent Parliament from establishing new ales in 
the Indian Act in the future that discriminate on the basis 
of sex. 
International law also dictates the recognition offunda- 
mental civil and political rights of Aboriginal women 
under the I n t m h n a l  Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; the Convention on the Elimination ofAU Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, and the Universal Deck- 
ration ofHurnan Rights. Other sections of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedom also rquire governments to respect 
the civil and political rights of all women, including 
Aboriginal women. Human rights codes of the provinces 
and territories call for the adherence to fundamental 
human rights without discrimination based on race or sex. 
All of these instruments should prevent both Parliament 
and Aboriginal communities from discriminating against 
Aboriginal women on the basis of sex or race in future. At 
least some of them will be valuable in challenging existing 
discrimination that is still going on. 
Three events have occurred in constitutional history 
that lead to the conclusion that Aboriginal women's civil 
and political rights are "existing" Aboriginal and treaty 
rights. In 1982, the Constitution Act recognized gender 
equality in sections 15 and 28 at the same time that it also 
recognized existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. In 1983, 
all First Ministers and Aboriginal representatives en- 
dorsed the inclusion of secrion 35(4) in the Constitution 
Act, I982 to recognize that men and women qually enjoy 
Aboriginal and treaty rights. In 1985, Parliament passed 
amendments to the Indian Act purportedly to eradicate 
sex discrimination against Indian women. What the Spar- 
row decision adds is an end to the federal theory that 
Aboriginal rights have been extinguished by regulations. 
Just as the Aboriginal right to fish was not extinguished by 
specific fisheries legislation, so, too, the Indian Acthas not 
extinguished female civil and political rights. There can be 
no extinguishment by regulation of Aboriginal women's 
civil, political and property rights.5 
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l h l i e  and Macguire note that An Act of1851, 14-15 
Victoria, c. 59, was the first to exclude white men married 
to Indian women from being "legal Indians," but white 
women married to Indian men and their children would 
henceforth be "Indians.". At page 55, the authors report 
that the Act of 1869 "was the first Canadian statute 
governing status of native women after marriage to non- 
Indians, or to Indians of other bands." The 1876 Act 
disenfranchised illegitimate children, Indians who lived 
continuously outside Canada for five years and to half- 
breeds. 
2~ection 35(1) states: "The existing Aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby 
recognized and affirmed." 
3See Slattery (781-82); McNeil (258); Pentney. 
4"1n this context, the Court is citingAgawa: "The second 
principle.. . emphasized the importance of Indian history 
and traditions as well as the perceived effect of a treaty at 
the time of its execution. He also cautioned against 
determining Indian rights in avacuum. The honour of the 
Crown is involved in the interpretation of Indian treaties, 
as a consequence, Fairness to the Indians is a governing 
consideration.. .This view is reflected in recent judicial 
decisions which have emphasized the responsibility of 
government to protect the rights of Indians arising from 
the special trust relationship created by history, treaties 
and legislation: see Gwrin v. The Queen (1984), 13 
D.L.R (4th) 321" (215-16). 
5"1n fact, extinguishment by regulation has for many years 
been a premise of the federal Indian claims policy. If the 
doctrine has 'no merit', which is certainly the view for the 
time being of the Supreme Court of Canada, then a 
substantial chunk of the governmental defences against 
Aboriginal rights claims across Cana &...may collapsen 
(Binnie 226). 
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he "bible of the mental-health profession," the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental-Health Disorders) is the guide all psychiatrists, therapists, and social workers use to 
determine who may be judged incompetent or disturbed. This powerful manual is constructed by a 
small clique in  the psychiatric establishment dominated by conservative white males. As a member 
of two DSM committees considering specific diagnostic categories, Dr. Caplan is able to offer first 
hand an insider's view of the DSM decision-making process. 
"...the influential American Psychiatric Association had decided to create a category of 
psychiatric abnormality called "Masochistic Personality Disorder" (MPD) ... the concept 
of masochism had been used for a long time, most often to distort women's motives and 
behavior so that they seemed bizarre and sick,..Few women who were suffering or unhappy 
escaped being pathologized, treated as abnormal, ... women who denied that they wanted to be 
hurt were said to be unconscious masochists ... women who had been raised to be traditional, 
"good wives" were ... stamped as abnormal, because putting other people's needs ahead of 
one's own without being appreciated was part of the MPD description.. . " 
Paula J. Caplan, Ph.D., a clinical and research psychologist with appointment in  
Psychiatry and Women Studies at the University of Toronto and the author of the 
best-selling The Myth of Women's Masochism and Don't Blame Mother, brings to the fore 
a shocking expose of the process by which the mental-health elite judge us all. 
Addison-Wesley Publishers Limited 
Toll Free Order Phone 1-800-387-8028 
Toll Free Order Fax 1-800-465-0536 
At All Fine Bookstores. 
38 CANADIAN WOMAN STUDIESILES CAHIERS DE LA FEMME 
